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Introduction  
The capitalist ‘global economy’ continues to hobble along, especially in the global North, 
racked by recurrent crisis (financial, debt, fiscal…) and barely returning to economic growth. 
This contemporary crisis of capitalism has also unleashed a crisis of the economics 
mainstream – which spectacularly failed to foresee the looming problems – that may yet 
prove to be a singular opportunity for heterodox political economy.  To date, any such change 
seems not to be occurring (e.g. Chakrabortty 2012) even as a slew of books has been 
published critiquing mainstream economics, economic debate has been invigorated by the 
growth of economic blogs (e.g. Keen vs. Krugman, Economist 2011) and a host of websites 
and listserve emails have emerged (e.g. Yves Smith’s nakedcapitalism). 
 
There are at least two elements to this challenge to mainstream economics.  Politically, the 
multiple, overlapping crises – not just of capitalism, but also at least a ‘triple crisis’ of 
political economy, ecology/resources and knowledge production – have shifted the ground on 
which political economy must (and ‘economics’ should) be able  to comment informatively; 
from the traditional focus on industry and trade to include also a diverse set of issues such as 
the commercialisation of science, innovation (including of novel ontological capabilities) in a 
‘knowledge-based’ economy, socio-technical system transitions and the interaction of 
economy and ‘nature’ (often mediated by science and technology).  These are all inter-related 
in complex and overlapping ways and so call for a research program that is capable of 
illuminating these connections and, preferably, ways to minimize the suffering associated 
with the triple crisis. These issues come together within an ‘economics of science’, but one 
assuming a broad, systemic perspective. Yet, epistemically, mainstream economics is 
incapable of furnishing an economics of science that is critical and explanatory, rather than 
axiomatic and ahistorical – asking the key questions of ‘why these changes? now? here? with 
what consequences (for science, innovation, society, political economy)?’ An economics of 
science is thus something of a test-case for economics and its transformation.   
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The pathological state of mainstream economics is no news for many, however, including the 
growing body of work in the philosophy of economics that has sought to introduce 
ontological concerns into the discipline.  Most obviously, since the mid-90s at least, Tony 
Lawson (and then other critical realists) has been arguing for a fundamental ‘reorientation’ 
(2003) of economics so that it actually examines the economic reality it purports to 
illuminate.  In this context, the economic and economics crisis should be a golden 
opportunity to make definitive strides towards this laudable goal.  Yet there seems to have 
been a lack of commentary from critical realists regarding an alternative economic analysis 
both of how to respond to the crisis and its aetiology.  Much, if not most, work in the 
‘ontological turn’ of economic methodology is conducted at the level of philosophical 
argument alone.  Perhaps the urgency of concrete, substantive economic issues are such that 
there has been little space for these more abstract concerns.  Meanwhile, the critics of 
mainstream economics amassing the greatest attention are those directly ‘debunking’ its 
substantive theoretical positions, especially if they can make the self-congratulatory claim of 
having been one of the supposed few to have seen ‘it’ coming (e.g. Keen 2011).  
Nevertheless, confronted with this opportunity, a challenge for the ontological critique of 
economics arises with renewed insistence and urgency, namely: how can ontological analysis 
contribute to the construction of alternative perspectives that are compelling, both 
epistemically and politically? Or to phrase this more polemically, why bother with more 
time-wasting abstract discussion of ontology instead of directly challenging and changing 
economics (where this may make use of a rough-and-ready philosophical appeal to make 
economics more ‘realistic’)? 
 
This paper takes a different approach regarding the ontological turn, namely to demonstrate, 
rather than merely argue for, the contribution of ontological attention to political economy.
1
  
We thus start with the substantive problem of developing an economics of science capable of 
illuminating the commercialisation of science and its interaction with and implications for 
broader social crises, arguing thence that ontological attention is a crucial step in this 
theoretical project.  The inadequacies of mainstream economics for such a project show that 
an economics of science demands profound rethinking of the ontological presuppositions of 
‘economics’.  Political economy also has much to learn from productive synthesis with 
disciplines that have engaged with these issues for many years, including evolutionary 
                                                 
1
 This paper is a summary of two recent volumes (Tyfield 2012a, 2012b). 
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economics of innovation and science & technology studies; issues, moreover, that are 
intimately and inextricably connected to ontological and epistemological reflection on the 
nature of ‘techno-science’ and its world-making powers.  This yields the contours of a new 
research programme of a ‘cultural political economy of research & innovation’ (CPERI) 
(Tyfield 2012b). Yet such mutual engagement of political economy and STS also demands 
rethinking of the ontological (and epistemic) presuppositions of both disciplines, given that 
the former is presumptively realist in both epistemology and (social) ontology while the latter 
is foundationally anti-realist, constructivist and sceptical of social structures.   
 
This therefore suggests a way in which ontological analysis can not only contribute 
significantly to the emergence of a powerful alternative economics but also thereby actually 
demonstrate the difference it makes to substantive economic understanding.  Accordingly, 
this paper summarizes the argument for a CPERI, built on the productive synthesis of a 
relational Marxist political economy and empirical studies of science and innovation, while 
also highlighting the key role that critical realist ontological analysis plays in this research 
programme. Moreover, incorporating substantive concerns from the outset also affords 
illustration of genuinely dialectical development (in which ontological arguments are 
themselves honed through interaction with substantive research, rather than vice versa alone). 
Several major criticisms of ontological work’s contribution to economics are thus tackled, 
regarding its alleged irrelevance to or unbridgeable remoteness from actual research, its 
arrogant ex cathedra pronouncements and its infallibility.   
 
Economics and Ontology: An Alternative Approach  
The argument for ontology arises in no small part from the nature and standing of the subject 
of critique, namely mainstream, neoclassical economics.  Prior to the economic crisis, at 
least, this discipline could credibly (for many) claim that its uniquely high status in the social 
sciences was merely a reflection of its similarly unique scientific authority.  In this context, a 
major motivation for the turn to questions of philosophy was in order to demonstrate that, far 
from standing on this epistemic higher ground, mainstream economics is itself without 
epistemic warrant.  In short, we can seek instead the determinate negation of this dominant 
framework by altogether uprooting it.  As Fine’s (2010) discussion of ‘zombienomics’ makes 
clear, this cannot license any expectation of such a critique alone producing determinate 
negation in practice, but we may at least consider it a necessary if not a sufficient condition 
of this change in the discipline. 




This critique of mainstream economics starts from the observation that it is a necessary 
condition of the intelligibility of each and every theory of knowledge (and thus each and 
every actual scientific theory) that reality is such that it can be thus described (e.g. Lawson 
1997: 19).  Furthermore, all theories are thus ‘realist’ in the sense of presupposing some 
conception of the nature of reality (ibid.: 19 & 48), i.e. all theories, and indeed all intentional 
actions that employ belief, have ontological presuppositions. We are therefore bound to admit 
that we are committed to particular understandings of the nature of reality and that these must 
also be uncovered and tested for consistency with our explicit views on such matters. 
 
Examination of these ontological presuppositions is a strictly philosophical task, employing 
transcendental reasoning, which asks the question “what must be the case given that the 
premise (of the transcendental argument) is intelligible?” (see Tyfield 2012a: Ch.8; 2007).  
This is the primary focus and distinguishing feature of critical realism as a philosophical 
project: to counsel the need for such explicit consideration of our ontological presuppositions, 
or what I have called “ontological attention” (Tyfield 2012a).  Such a “critical” philosophy 
can work by immanent critique that uses transcendental argument – working from premises 
that gain both their particular meaning and ontological purchase, through being genuinely 
believed to be true, from a socio-historically specific and pragmatically given critical context 
– to expose underlying contradictions in our given understanding. There is thus an irreducible 
role for philosophy (qua ontology) as “underlabourer” for the sciences (Lawson 1997: 45).  
As such, critical realism marks a wholesale break with much (if not most) modern 
mainstream philosophy of science in its turning back to ontology as the fundamental and 
distinctive task of philosophical argument, against the anti-metaphysical programme of the 
former.   
 
From this starting point, the ontological presuppositions of mainstream economics are 
compared with those of the actual social practices that it purports to study, including pre-
eminently the phenomenon of individual choice.  This yields the conclusion that the world 
presupposed by mainstream economics is radically different from, and incompatible with, the 
open, dynamic, stratified economic reality.  Mainstream economics is thus equally radically 
incapable of producing scientific knowledge that elucidates economic phenomena. 
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We will not focus on criticism of this particular argument, of which there has been much (e.g. 
Fullbrook 2009, Hausman 1998).  As others have also noted, much of this criticism tends 
simply to misread Lawson’s argument or restate it in terms that fundamentally distort the 
point and so render it absurd (Morgan 2012).  Even so, in the utterly changed context of the 
present, when mainstream economics, while still supreme, is also facing intense public and 
academic scepticism, questions regarding the significance of the ontological critique (‘the 
significance of the significance of realism’ as Morgan (2012) puts it) are assuming renewed 
importance.  This is no doubt partly because the compelling critical argument it offers no 
longer has the same motivation: mainstream economics did categorically fail to foresee 
anything like the financial/economic crisis and everybody knows this. The critical argument is 
thus reduced to the role of explaining why or how economics is so inadequate; again a task 
that is more immediately compelling at the level of substantive errors, absurdities, 
contradictions etc… as in Steve Keen’s (2011) romp through all the holy cows of neoclassical 
economics (e.g. downward-sloping aggregate demand curves, upward-sloping aggregate 
supply curves, equilibrium of any kind etc…).  In its place, therefore, the demands to show 
how ontology contributes to construction of a better alternative become commensurately 
louder.  In this context, the repetitive and now familiar pattern of inadequate, partial or straw-
man criticism of Lawson followed by restatement and clarification but no actual development 
is dissatisfying, to say the least (Morgan 2012). 
 
Moreover, such positive guidelines for a ‘realist’ economics as have been formulated, namely 
the methodology based on contrastive demi-regularities (Lawson 2003), are not particularly 
compelling.  For even if this methodology could work in various non-laboratory natural 
sciences, there are problems with the applicability of this conception to the social sciences, at 
least as the primary methodology.  In short, the problems of under-determination, and hence 
judgemental relativism, for the social sciences that arise from the nature of their object as 
itself intentional are simply not adequately addressed by hypothetical retroduction from 
contrastive demi-regs (Tyfield 2012a).   
 
Where then does this leave the contribution of ontology to a revitalised (political) economics?  
Instead of continual debate limited to the level of philosophy, an alternative route is actually 
to explore and so demonstrate what difference ontological attention makes to substantive 
economic enquiry.  Given the intense contemporary importance of the subject matter, its 
theoretical novelty and the current incompatibility of mainstream economics with any such 
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project (see below), the ‘economics of science’ provides a very promising substantive project 
on which to pursue this goal.  The remainder of the paper illustrates this alternative approach. 
 
Before we turn to this, however, let us briefly consider the key contributions of ontological 
attention.  First, as already mentioned, is the fact that ontological commitments are always 
presupposed and so must either be assessed explicitly or are likely to linger as festering 
contradictions. Conversely, the core ontological argument of critical realism affords the 
elaboration of a unique ontology that is both attentive to (rather than dismissive of) the 
concept and nature of ‘reality’ but also attuned to the constructivism constitutive of human or 
social realities (including diverse socio-natures) (e.g. Benton 2001).  The ontology of critical 
realism thus conceives of ‘reality’ as simultaneously real and conditional, emergent and 
mediated, structural/systemic and relational.   
 
Secondly, at the level of social scientific theory choice, assuming a critical realist perspective 
regarding the economics of science in particular sponsors a relational Marxist approach.  
Against the demi-reg method, therefore, ontological attention offers an alternative 
methodology for social sciences.  This follows from the insight that the very intentionality of 
the object of study entails that it also comes with ontological presuppositions and these can 
themselves be subjected to transcendental analysis.  This is therefore to propose a critical 
methodology on grounds of realism that employs a substantive transcendental argument, a 
key example of which is (a qualitative reading of) Marx’s labour theory of value (LTV).  Just 
like the philosophical transcendental arguments that characterise critical realism’s 
transcendental realism (Bhaskar 2008) and Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics, this 
involves an examination of conditions of possibility of given social phenomena; in this case 
the ubiquity of commodities characteristic of contemporary economic life (Marx 1999).  This 
‘qualitative reading’ is engaged in the “causal-explanatory” project of examining the “causal 
mechanisms, social structures, powers and relations” (Fleetwood 2001: 67, original 
emphasis) that govern the actual historical course of economic events.
2
  In short, Marx’s 
singular insight is to ask ‘what are the ontological presuppositions of this two-fold nature of 
the commodity (as both exchange value and use value)?’  This is the specific concern of the 
LTV: ‘what is presupposed by the existence of systemic markets that give rise to the fixed 
                                                 
2
This approach thus side-steps both the vast majority of objections to the LTV, including the neo-Sraffian ones, 
which (correctly) repudiate it as a quantitative theory of how the price of goods is determined, and the 
associated ‘transformation problem’.  
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exchange values characteristic of commodities?’  (Fine & Saad-Filho 2004: 17).  This project 
“encourages an enquiry into the nature of (alienated) labouring activity and its form of 
appearance” (Fleetwood 2001: 78), i.e. an ontological reading that provides the theoretical 
terminology that refers to the social structures whose action we are then concerned to 
investigate empirically.   
 
This is thus to advocate a ‘relational Marxism’, in which the categories of Marxian analysis 
emerge from examination of the presuppositions of given socio-historical understanding of 
economic activity.  On this reading, therefore, it is arguably at least as, if not more, accurate 
to describe value theory as the ‘value theory of labour’ rather than the ‘labour theory of 
value’ (Elson 1979), i.e. the investigation of the implications of (socially ubiquitous) 
subjection of labour to the particular capitalist economic category of ‘value’.  Moreover, this 
in turn yields a series of key concepts including a constellation of (at least) twelve concepts 
(see Tyfield 2012b for more details).  Six of them are at a relatively high level of abstraction, 
namely: 
 Value; 
 Labour (as source and substance of value); 
 Fictitious commodities (of labour, but also land, money and, in particular, 
knowledge); 
 Emergence of a real totality of the ‘economy’; 
 The inherent improbability of capital accumulation; and hence,  
 The constitutive role of ‘extra-economic’ factors in construction of the ‘economy’, 
including irreducible issues of politics and culture/semiosis. 
 
The other six arise from meso-level theory, (mutually) informed by value theory, namely: 
 Spatio-temporal fixes and a cluster of associated terms, including a political-economic 
(possibility) space or settlement; 
 Hegemony (at nation-state and international level); 
 Historic bloc; 
 Financialization;  
 A relational conception of the state; and 
 Primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession. 
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This thereby directs the researcher to, and legitimizes, a broad swathe of neo-Gramscian 
work in international political economy.
3
   
 
Finally, critical realism thereby provides the philosophical grounds on which to build 
productive synthesis of what are otherwise foundationally incompatible disciplines regarding 
the ‘economy’ and ‘science’, as is needed for an ‘economics of science’.  For whereas 
political economy is concerned with real social structures that are credible only in the context 
of a philosophical realism, the discipline of science & technology studies has been founded 
(and most famously and fruitfully developed) on an essential repudiation of realism, 
including of real social structures.  Grounded in a critical realist philosophy, however, 
productive engagement becomes possible, opening up the reciprocal examination of the 
conditioning of techno-scientific trajectories by political economic structures, on the one 
hand, and the mediation of the construction of economic value and the regularisation of 
capital accumulation by techno-scientific innovations, imaginaries, institutions and 
materialities, on the other.  A relational Marxist perspective thereby affords an analysis of 
scientific change that includes the reality of the social relation of capital as a key but 
neglected element of non-reductionistic explanation of these crucial, causally over-
determined processes. 
 
We therefore highlight three key ways in which ontological analysis has a unique 
contribution to make to the construction of an alternative economics: 
1) Directly, via substantive transcendental argument and the relational Marxism that 
follows; 
2) Indirectly, following this, by directing attention to and legitimating (hence 
‘underlabouring’) specific substantive work for critical comparison and synthesis; and 
3) Indirectly as ontological/epistemological ground for productive synthesis with 
empirical bodies of work that offer considerable insight into the contemporary science 
and/or innovation.   
We focus here on illustrating these points regarding the evolutionary economics of 
innovation, though the argument applies equally and importantly to constructivist science & 
technology studies (Tyfield 2012b: Chs. 9-11). 
                                                 
3
 In particular, the “neo-Gramscian” school of Robert Cox, the Braudelian economic history of Giovanni 
Arrighi, and the “regulation approach” of Robert Boyer, Michel Aglietta and Alain Lipietz and, especially, Bob 
Jessop. For references, see Tyfield (2012b). 




The Problem of the ‘Economics of Science’  
There has been a broad process of commercializing science for over 30 years now, most 
obviously in the US, but also across the global North and even recently in the emerging 
global powers of the BRIC countries.  For example: 
 
 Privatization of research funding:  
Private funding of scientific research in the US has grown 3.8 times in real terms (8.7 in 
nominal terms) since 1980 as against increases of federal government funding of 1.5 times 
(3.5).  Private funding of total R&D has thus grown to 65-70% of total national R&D 
expenditure in the decade from 1998-2008 from just under 50% in 1980 (NSF 2010), with 
most of this funding being directed to research itself conducted by private industry.  At 
universities, too, commercial funding has increased dramatically.   
 
 Commercial ‘accountability’ and ‘relevance’/‘impact’ criteria in competitive public 
funding:  
Public funding too has increasingly come with strings attached that test the commercial 
relevance of research; an “auditing culture” that seeks to quantify research achievements (e.g.  
Shore 2008).   
 
 Growth in university-industry relations (UIRs) and direct incorporation of science into 
commerce:  
These range from privately-funded centres or entire departments to smaller projects and 
collaborations and, especially in fields relating to hi-tech industries such as biotechnology or 
information technology, spin-off firms.  At the most successful research universities, this has 
created a revolving door between university and commerce. 
 
 Growth in patenting, especially at universities and especially in life sciences:  
Since the early 1970s (before the passing of the US Bayh-Dole Act allowing patenting of 
publicly-funded research (Mowery et al. 2004)), patenting at universities, especially in the 
US, has grown rapidly.  Moreover, this growth has been particularly marked in high-growth 
sectors of science-intensive high-technology, such as biotechnology.   
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 Commodification of higher education:  
Science education has also become progressively privatised, with student fees an increasingly 
important source of revenue and transforming students into ‘consumers’ of higher education 
(Slaughter & Rhoades 2007, Jessop et al. 2008).  In the US, in particular, there has also been 
a significant growth in for-profit higher education, rising some 59% in 3 years to 3.2 million 
students at 3000 colleges in 2008-9, and representing 11.7% of all American students 
(Economist 2010: 130). 
 
 Strong, global intellectual property rights, especially for life sciences and ICT:  
Finally, the 1995 ‘Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property’ agreement (TRIPs) 
instituted strong IPRs that would benefit only a handful of (largely US-based) transnational 
corporations, particularly those in the IP-sensitive industries of pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, 
ICTs and entertainment (e.g. Sell 2003, Drahos & Braithwaite 2002).  This trumped historical 
precedent in which nation-states have tended gradually to strengthen IP law to reflect the 
strength of domestic industries dependent upon them (Chang 2002, May & Sell 2006). 
 
In fact, there is no clear ex ante or philosophical reason why the increasing prevalence of 
scientific research done within or funded by private industry should be seen as a problematic 
phenomenon (Shapin 2008).  For instance, it is increasingly difficult to maintain any neat 
correlation between the institutional location of scientific research and the kind or standard of 
research, with Nobel prize-winning science conducted in private laboratories and university 
teams working on ‘applied’ sciences.  Nevertheless, together all these changes have raised 
serious concerns about the future of scientific research and its institutions. For instance, 
Radder (2010: 14) lists eight issues that have attracted critical comment: 
1) The potentially undesirable influence of commercial interests on research methods 
and results; 
2) Higher levels of secrecy as scientific findings are transformed into commercial 
secrets; 
3) Downgrading of research disciplines not seen as relevant from the perspective of 
profitable economic activity; 
4) A short-termism in research agendas, as commercial investment demands quick pay-
off, to the detriment of longer-term ‘basic’ research or other socially beneficial 
projects; 
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5) Assorted objections (ethical, legal, philosophical, religious etc…) to the patentability 
of academic research, especially those associated with the life sciences; 
6) Conflicts of interest and exploitation of public funds for private gain by 
entrepreneurial scientists; 
7) Detrimental effects on public trust in science more generally and the (seemingly) 
‘disinterested’ epistemic authority of scientific findings; and 
8) General concerns regarding the “justifiability of the privatization and economic 
instrumentalization of public knowledge”. 
 
Moreover, as Kleinman (2010) stresses, these impacts need not be the effect only of direct 
private investment but may also, if not primarily, arise from a more pervasive and indirect 
transformation of academic research cultures.   
 
These exceptionally broad and far-reaching changes (and on a global scale) have generated a 
pervading sense of crisis.  They have also been implicated, via an investment strike due to 
over-propertisation of knowledge, in the global economic crisis (Pagano & Rossi 2009).  It is 
no surprise, therefore, that there has been a proliferation of projects devoted to understanding 
the ‘economics of science’.  Yet none of the projects that have received widespread attention 
are concerned with exploring and explaining the changing economic underpinning of 
scientific research as a historical process with profound social repercussions.  In other words, 
the crucial questions of ‘why these changes in the economics of science, in these places and 
now?’  are almost entirely elided by such work.  Instead, these projects employ mainstream 
economic analysis to investigate the institutional conditions for the optimal allocation of 
resources in order to maximize output of scientific research.  They are ‘economics’ not in the 
sense of exploring economic aspects of science but rather in employing forms of 
(mainstream) economic analysis (Sent, 1999).   
 
This includes the high-profile work of David and Dasgupta (1994) regarding a ‘new 
economics of science’ (NES), which follows the standard procedure of exploring ways to 
rectify the market failure of socially optimal production of the public good of ‘knowledge’.  
Even while acknowledging the importance of tacit knowledge as undermining to some extent 
the public good argument, the NES still treats ‘knowledge’ in its models as an uncomplicated 
commodity that is to be maximized (Mirowski & Sent 2002).  Qualitative issues regarding 
the effect of funding upon which avenues of scientific enquiry are pursued and the even more 
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serious possibility that the very character of ‘knowledge’ itself may be dramatically debased 
by certain funding arrangements (consider, for instance, the possible reduction of ‘science’ to 
partisan corporate advertising) are simply overlooked (Mirowski 2011).  No less importantly, 
this project has failed even on its own terms.  Despite some fifteen years of intense research 
activity regarding related issues, there remains little apart the original papers to show for the 
development of a broader economics of science programme.  As Mirowski (2009) puts it, 
“the landscape [of the mainstream economics of information], far from being crowded with 
monumental theorems and general models, is merely dotted with abandoned half-finished 
shells.” 
 
These problems hinge on the intrinsic difficulty, if not impossibility, of exploring the 
economics of science (or knowledge or information) using mainstream economic models 
built upon market exchange.  Boyle (1996), for instance, notes that market models 
investigating the equilibrium of supply and demand for a commodity are built upon the 
assumption that individual agents have perfect information.  When the commodity is itself 
information, therefore, models run up against intractable contradictions with their very 
assumptions.  At the very least, as the access to information becomes more limited, the 
models become more complicated and less mathematically tractable, while such supposed 
mathematical rigour and analytical parsimony is a primary appeal of these models.  Mirowski 
(2009: 138-9) too notes that: 
 
“You cannot paint the marketplace of ideas as a marvellously parsimonious and 
magnificently efficient model of cognition if you can’t even demonstrate mathematically 
that the internal production of neoclassical market equilibrium does not bear the 
information requirements that outstrip any other known process.” 
 
Similarly, “the price of the marketplace of ideas leads to formally undecidable market 
prices.”  In short, there are good reasons, reflected in the actual, historical experience of the 
various projects attempting a (post-)neoclassical-based economics of information, to suppose 
it is an impossible task.  
 
But similar conclusions may also be reached by consideration of the second half of this 
phrase, namely what is the economics of science an economics of? This question shifts our 
attention to a slightly different literature on the commercialisation of science. We have 
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already briefly seen the problems raised by assuming a mainstream economic perspective 
regarding this issue.  For taking such a stance, and hence seeking to understand ‘science’ in 
terms of a market, necessarily demands that there be some ‘thing’ that is produced by science 
and which it is self-evidently a social good to maximize.  From this starting point, it is 
extremely hard not to proffer models that reduce science to a familiar commodity, at least not 
without bringing the usefulness of this approach fundamentally into question.  
 
Unfortunately, however, much of the literature on the commercialisation of science is just as 
problematic regarding its perspective on the nature of science and the interaction of ‘science’ 
and ‘money’.  Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) describe this literature in terms of a debate 
between “Economic Whigs” and “Mertonian Tories”.  The former are simply concerned with 
maximizing the productivity of ‘science’ and, true to their Whiggish (neo-) liberalism, tend to 
promote the commercialisation of science as a progressive development without any 
complications or problems for scientific research.
4
   
 
Conversely, the latter adopt the Mertonian perspective of science being dependent upon 
social norms that leave it in splendid isolation from the corrosive influences of commerce and 
self-interest.
5
  The commercialisation of science is thus treated as the catastrophic passing of 
a former Golden Age (i.e. the post-war period of the trente glorieuses of 1945-75) in which 
the state ‘wisely’ chose to fund science generously for the public good.  Although this 
approach shows a much clearer concern regarding the interaction of changing economic 
arrangements and scientific research, it too is highly problematic.  In particular, the notion of 
‘science’ it employs systematically excludes socio-political concerns except insofar as they 
are distortions or corruptions of the scientific enterprise.  The Mertonian perspective is thus 
merely the flipside of the errors of the Economic Whigs, both frameworks effectively ruling 
out the investigation of the actual effects of different funding arrangements on science, if for 
diametrically opposed reasons.  In neither case, therefore, is there any need for (let alone 
possibility of) empirical investigation into the actual effects, both negative and positive, on 
science of changing economic arrangements because the answer is already known.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that if we are interested in actually investigating questions such as ‘how 
is/are science/s funded?’, ‘how and why has this changed?’ and ‘how have these changes 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Etzkowitz et al. (2000), Etzkowitz & Peters (1991)  
5
 See e.g. Boyle (2003), Krimsky (2003) and references in Mirowski & Sent (2008). 
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affected that/those science/s?’ we must employ a completely different conception of science, 
just as we must employ a different economics.  This perspective would not only recognize the 
variety of social practices designated ‘science’ – or, more accurately, research and innovation 
– and attend to their concrete particularities, but it would also acknowledge that science is 
itself constituted as an irreducibly socio-historical process, with all the economic, cultural and 
political ‘thickness’ this entails.  This vision of science is closely akin to that developed with 
science and technology studies (STS) under the rubric of ‘co-production’ of science and 
‘society’, i.e. the mutual constitution of relatively autonomous social phenomena (e.g. 
Jasanoff 2004).   
 
Such a redefinition of ‘science’, however, also brings with it significant consequences for the 
form of economics that is capable of studying it in at least two obvious respects.  First, the 
very subject matter of an economics that is relevant to the study of the economics of science 
(as opposed to the various reified definitions of Economic Whigs and Mertonian Tories) 
demands that we employ an economics that is capable of exploring economic aspects of an 
inseparably socio-political and cultural reality.  The second challenge is methodological and 
arguably more profound. Since co-production posits a social ontology of science in which the 
very nature of science develops alongside that of its broader socio-economic context, it 
becomes epistemologically impossible to employ a framework that must first define what 
science is before proceeding to examine its economics.  Whereas the co-production analysis 
is thus concerned to develop our understanding of the nature of research and innovation 
through analysis of its interactive development with is socioeconomic context – i.e. to stretch 
towards a ‘definition’ of science as its conclusion – the axiomatic and ‘deductivist’ structure 
of mainstream economics requires the ‘science’ it is investigating be defined ex ante and so 
reified.  
 
Quite simply, then, mainstream economics cannot illuminate the commercialisation of 
science and the knowledge economy more broadly, and demand for just such understanding 
can only grow, especially in the context of crisis and discontent such as the present.  Taken 
together, therefore, these two challenges illustrate how an economics of science offers a 
singular opportunity and motivation for a broader substantive project to develop an 
alternative economics that breaks with the mainstream discipline and addresses issues that 
will be at the very heart of economic concerns for future generations (Cf Sent 1999 for 
similar sentiments).   




We now turn, therefore, to a brief illustration of the difference ontological attention does in 
fact make, regarding formulation of a critical, explanatory political economy of research and 
innovation through engagement with the evolutionary economics of innovation.  In doing so, 
we will highlight the three contributions of ontological analysis listed above. 
 
From EEI to CPERI 
The school of thought that is variously called ‘innovation studies’ or (as we shall call it here) 
the ‘evolutionary economics of innovation’ (EEI) is without doubt the literature that has 
contributed most to current understanding of the processes of technological change and 
innovation.  Its inclusion in any research programme on the ‘economics of science’ is thus 
hardly short of obligatory.  From the perspective of a CPERI, five strengths, in particular, 
stand out. 
 
First, EEI does indeed share a prima facie compatibility with neo-Gramscian political 
economy, affording comparison that brings out differences that are informative.  Conversely, 
the latter has not paid the same due heed to issues of scientific and technological change as 
has EEI.  Much of this connection may be explained by the foundational influence on EEI of 
the works of Schumpeter.  For Schumpeter not only stands alone in the ‘canon’ of Great 
Economists in his emphasis upon the importance of an economic sociology (Swedberg 1987), 
hence calling for an economics that is more akin to Lawson’s (1997) critical realist 
“economics as social theory”.  But he is also exceptional in the importance he placed upon 
the works of Marx and the Marxian argument for the quintessential dynamism of a capitalist 
economy and hence the central role of (technological) innovation (Bottomore 1992).   
 
The second key strength of EEI is its empirical attention to actual processes of technical 
change and innovation, together with an attractive scepticism and reflexivity on how little is 
known about these phenomena (e.g. Freeman 1994: 473/4).  Amongst the most important of 
these has been the growing body of work that has comprehensively dismantled the dominant 
idea of science and innovation policy of the ‘linear model’ of innovation (Kline & Rosenberg 
1986,  Mowery & Sampat 2006), which posits the sequence of basic science  applied 
science/ technology   innovation & diffusion  economic growth.   
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The third significant strength follows directly, regarding EEI’s theoretically sophisticated and 
empirically grounded critique of the two key arms of the economic argument for the 
commercialisation of science and strong intellectual property rights, namely the linear model 
(as just discussed) and the ‘public good argument’.6  The core insight undercutting the latter 
is the increasingly undeniable evidence against the presumption of the non-rivalry and non-
appropriability of knowledge.  The conjunction of insights regarding the much greater 
importance of tacit knowledge together with the diverse roles and stages of the contribution 
of science to innovation leads to a much more complex picture regarding the economic 
incentives or lack thereof for private production of scientific knowledge, and hence the case 
for public subsidy.  For instance, building up tacit knowledge may take a long time with only 
uncertain, prospective and medium-to-long term benefits promised in return, while the 
relevant personnel are not contributing to profitability in the meantime.  It is also difficult to 
measure and so assess or purchase, and in many cases (e.g. encultured and embedded 
organizational or management ‘knowledges’) it adheres to the individual, not the firm. 
 
The fourth reason that EEI is so important for a political economy of research and innovation 
resides in multiple fundamental insights that provide both (a) an expansive approach to 
innovation, as the process that mediates between scientific research and economic growth 
(insofar as there is such a link in a particular case) and (b) a broad set of factors that must be 
taken into account in any detailed research programme.  These insights would include: 
 
1) First and foremost, the fact that innovation and technical change is an evolutionary 
process, a “groping” (Nelson & Winter 2002), the outcomes of which are fundamentally 
uncertain and unpredictable (Rosenberg 1994, Dosi 1988).  In what is essentially a realist 
move, this also leads EEI to significant methodological and theoretical conclusions regarding 
an economics that can take innovation seriously, let alone research it.   
 
2) Secondly, therefore, EEI is also explicitly critical of the cursory interest mainstream 
economics shows in technological (and scientific) change, which, unable to be incorporated 
into its models, is merely “black-boxed” (Rosenberg 1982).  Similarly, against the fetishism 
for mathematical modelling and deductive ‘rigour’, for EEI, study of actual technological and 
                                                 
6
 Though it must be noted that, in fact, it may be plausibly argued that EEI has been most influential in the 
corridors of power in just the opposite direction (Mirowski & Sent 2008, Godin 2006) 
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economic change demands a much greater (inter-disciplinary) role for history (Freeman & 
Louça 2002) and qualitative or ‘appreciative’ theories (Nelson & Winter 1982).   
 
Fifth, EEI literature on long wave theories of the economics of techn(olog)ical change (ETC) 
(Perez 1983, 2002, Freeman and Perez 1988, Freeman and Louça 2002, Freeman 1994, 
Freeman and Soete 1997), following the seminal work of Kondratieff, is of particular interest 
for an economics of science since it provides a historical context for understanding changing 
economic conditions of, and demand for, research and innovation.  ETC also has significant 
strengths. First, it too is an explicit critique of such neoclassical economics, notably New 
Endogenous Growth Theory (NEGT), which ‘endogenizes’ technological change (or rather 
productivity increase through modelling the R&D process) into its models, thereby reducing 
technological change to a one-dimensional variable of rate of change.
7
   
 
Conversely, ETC uses (Kuhnian) concepts of “technoeconomic paradigm” and “technological 
revolution” (Perez 2002, Kuhn 1970) and the cycle associated with these conceptions to 
incorporate technological change seriously into economic explanation.  These concepts posit 
a model of ‘long waves’ of such paradigms. For the duration of a paradigm, then, not only the 
rate but also the direction of the technological change is fairly straightforward for all to see, 
resulting in technological complementarities and path dependence.  Technologies outside the 
paradigm, however, are excluded from development as not promising the same return on 
investment; the intrinsically uncertain nature of innovation privileges established patterns and 
processes that are known to be productive and to complement the parallel innovation of 
others on whom a given innovation’s success significantly depends.  The paradigm thus lends 
a cyclical temporality to innovation, in which there is first a surge of activity, then a 
steadying off to ‘normal’ growth (as per Kuhn’s normal science) and then a gradual maturity 
and decline as the paradigm’s technological fecundity approaches exhaustion.  At that point, 
new technologies will be favoured instead, this in turn precipitating the next technological 
revolution; a turbulent Schumpeterian process that is at no point characterised by equilibrium. 
 
Secondly, ETC also recognizes the crucial and singular role of finance in the growth of the 
economy (Perez 2002: 21, Orsenigo 1989: 26), which is left out of neoclassical accounts in 
which money is simply a more efficient means of exchange, a financial market is just another 
                                                 
7
 See e.g. Dosi & Nelson (1994), Verspagen (2006).  
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commodity market and finance does not have any emergent effects on the development of the 
economy (Bryan 1995, Evans 2004, Keen 2011).   
 
Finally, ETC, like its close disciplinary cousin STS, has a much more sophisticated hold on 
the importance of social factors in the shaping of technologies and in the actual trajectories of 
successful technoeconomic paradigms.  Indeed, these are “technoeconomic” paradigms for 
Perez, not merely “technological” ones, precisely in order to stress the overall social context 
and its interaction with technology.
8
  One particularly important feature of this is the period 
of political and social turbulence that inevitably follows from the emergence of a new 
revolutionary technology (Freeman & Perez 1988: 59, Perez 2002: 4, 24-26). 
 
The overall picture provided by ETC, therefore, is a credible and comprehensive systemic 
account of the coevolution of economic and technological change.  Empirically, this yields a 









Popular name for 
the period 
Core country or 
countries 
Big-bang initiating the 
revolution 
1771 FIRST The ‘Industrial 
Revolution’ 
Britain Arkwright’s mill opens in 
Cromford 
1829 SECOND Age of Steam & 
Railways 
Britain (spreading to 
Continent and USA) 
Test of the ‘Rocket’ steam 
engine for the Liverpool-
Manchester railway 
1875 THIRD Age of Steel, 
Electricity & Heavy 
Engineering 
USA and Germany 
forging ahead and 
overtaking Britain 
The Carnegie Bessemer 
steel plant opens in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
1908 FOURTH Age of Oil, the 
Automobile & Mass 
Production 
USA (with Germany at 
first vying for world 
leadership), later 
spreading to Europe 
First Model-T comes out 
of the Ford plant in 
Detroit, Michigan 
1971 FIFTH Age of Information & 
Telecommunications 
USA (spreading to 
Europe and Asia) 
The Intel microprocessor 
is announced in Santa 
Clara, California 
Source:  Perez (2002:11). 
On this conception, then, the period of the contemporary commercialisation of science was 
one of “irruption”, passing into “frenzy” (from 1987) in which the technological successes in 
the new paradigm, ICTs (information and communication technologies), led to a bubble of 
financial speculation built on the continuing growth of the revolutionary technology.   
 
                                                 
8
 Though compare Freeman & Perez (1988: 47) with Dosi (1982). 
9
 Compare similar tables in Dosi (1982), Freeman & Louça (2002: 141), Freeman & Perez (1988) and Freeman 
& Soete (1997). 
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EEI thus conclusively shows that there is, and can be, no such thing as a single, abstract 
‘economics of science’.  Moreover, regarding prospects for a vigorous and robust academic 
school, in the likes of Nelson, Freeman, Rosenberg and Pavitt, EEI is a school of unarguable 
stature and economic seriousness.  As such, it has as good a chance as any body of economics 
to challenge and transform the notoriously, unapologetically unreconstructed 
‘zombieconomics’ (Fine 2010) mainstream.   
 
Nevertheless, for all the strengths of EEI, there are also significant differences to the neo-
Gramscian perspective and significant weaknesses.  A critical, explanatory economics of 
science bring these out particularly clearly.  A key question here is ‘how does the periodicity 
of techno-economic paradigms help explain the recent commercialization of science?’  The 
neo-Gramscian perspective places politics (and culture) as constitutive of technological and 
economic change in the form of spatio-temporal fixes and modes of regularisation and 
societalization that constitute the (transitory, constructed) settlement of a political economic 
space.  As argued in detail elsewhere (Tyfield 2012b), therefore, this leads to a compelling 
explanation for the commercialisation of science as the accumulation by dispossession of an 
as-yet-uncapitalised sphere of social activity, namely ‘knowledge production’, so that capital 
accumulation may continue.  The timing is then explained in terms of a persistent 
overaccumulation crisis since the 1970s, leading to financialisation and the aggressive search 
for a new settlement of expanded capitalist relations of production.  The commercialisation of 
science is thus an intensely political phenomenon, not just a techno-economic one associated 
with the emergence of a ‘new (knowledge-based) economy’.   
 
Perez also constantly stresses the importance of politics in the setting of technoeconomic 
trajectories and the “mutual shaping” of politics and technology (ibid.: 19).  But when turning 
to the analysis itself ETC places technology at its centre and so treats politics as the 
epiphenomenon of the autonomous technoeconomic trajectory.  Hence “each technology does 
then indeed lead to a ‘new economy’ [and]… technology is behind the transformations” 
(ibid.: 145 & 7, 24, 155).  In particular, politics is seen either as the ad hoc context for 
particular technoeconomic developments (ibid.: 115, 123, 126) or as a functionalist safety 
valve that inevitably evinces the (generally socially progressive) change in regulatory 
framework necessary for the optimal exploitation of the technoeconomic paradigm (ibid.: 19, 
99, 129-136).  The irreducible contribution of willed political struggle in such progressive 
concessions is at the very least significantly downplayed.  Moreover, the explicit 
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acknowledgement of the importance of politics is belied by its total absence in the 
explanation of the creation of the new economy, as opposed to the social response to it, and 
hence in the explanation of the cycle itself.  As a result, the commercialisation of science 
(including e.g. TRIPs), must be understood – implausibly in both cases – either as the ‘old 
economy’s’ political intransigence or the essentially progressive forces of the new economy.   
 
These problems, however, point to deeper problems with the ETC framework, which revolve 
around its largely “neo-Kantian” ontological perspective (Bhaskar 2008: 9 & 25-26), in 
which the ‘surplus’ of theoretical terminology beyond empirical observation is construed as 
the idealized heuristics that best afford intelligible organisation of the empirical data.  
According to Bhaskar, such a stance can be distinguished from, on the one hand, a purely 
empiricist position and, on the other, a transcendental realist position for which theoretical 
terminology (when justified, may be legitimately, if defeasibly, understood to) refer(s) to real 
phenomena.   
 
It is clear, first of all, that ETC is a neo-Kantian framework, with its explicit invocations of 
heuristic ideal types.  This is equally apparent in its wholesale assumption of the Kuhnian 
conceptual apparatus of revolutions and paradigms (applied here to the “technoeconomy” 
instead of scientific knowledge).  But it follows that all the familiar problems associated with 
Kuhn’s argument are similarly taken on.  In particular, ETC necessarily overstates the 
discontinuity, at the total expense of continuity, of one paradigm from the next in the 
exogenously given “technological revolutions” (Dosi 1982: 90, Perez 2002: 25, footnote 33).  
 
Certainly, the timing of these shifts is integrated into the framework, on the basis that the 
maturity and decline of the existing paradigm sets up the conditions for the shift in 
investment to the next one.  But this does not answer the fundamental problem of “whence 
the next technology?” because ETC’s argument rests on a central circularity.  On the one 
hand, finance is attracted to the new technology because of its promise of greater profitability 
(Perez 2002: 11).  But, ex hypothesi, the new technology only takes off in a revolution when 
finance is already investing heavily in it (ibid.: 33), or else the timing remains a mystery.  The 
only way to resolve this is to presume ex ante that there is a next technology “waiting in the 
wings” (ibid.: 32) and that all that is required is for one paradigm to end for another to begin.  
But this is to place technology as an exogenous given, the driving force of the whole 
economy, pace express statements against such technological determinism (ibid.: 22).   




This fundamental problem, however, is inherited from ETC’s other major inspiration, 
Schumpeter.  For while it rightly focuses on the importance of technological innovation for 
the economy, and the resultant turbulent business cycle of economic growth, ETC, like 
Schumpeter, simply assumes that innovation will naturally occur (e.g. Fagerberg 2006: 1) and 
does not ask the question of “what are the social presuppositions of a systemic subjective 
drive, across economic life, to innovate?”  The effects of a new technological revolution are 
thus explained in terms of how it “fires the imagination” of prospective entrepreneurs and 
engineers and produces a new business common sense (i.e. paradigm), completely neglecting 
the objective social context (Freeman & Perez 1988: 48, Perez 2002: 16).  Similarly, ETC 
explanations are couched in terms of a subjective profit motive, but the objective (and 
exceptional) social context that is presupposed by this is not examined (Perez 1983: 358, 360 
& 366).   
 
As such, like Schumpeter, ETC overlooks the fact that even if innovation (as opposed to 
invention) is the differentia specifica of a capitalist economy, it has not itself emerged 
miraculously from nowhere in the modern world (Bottomore 1992).  Conversely, a neo-
Gramscian perspective highlights how a systemic imperative to innovate presupposes is the 
dominance of the social relations of production by the capital relation, which sets up the law 
of value that forces businesses to compete and innovate on pain of economic failure (Fine & 
Saad-Filho 2004, Arthur 2004).   
 
This critical weakness is also evident regarding the key issue of the role of finance. 
Comparison with ontologically-underlaboured neo-Gramscian argument (e.g. Arrighi 1994, 
2008) thus also allows a comparison regarding ETC’s explanatory power of the historical 
record.  Both the ETC and critical realist frameworks accord finance a crucial role in the 
transformation of the economy and the shift from one phase of growth to another.  Both 
parties also agree that finance assumes dominance over the economy, in particular through 
“making money from money” (ibid.: 98, 100) or the “financialisation” of the economy 
(Arrighi 1994 & 2003, Blackburn 2006) respectively.  Yet the significance of finance in the 
ETC schema is primarily its sponsorship of the new technologies, which will be at the heart 
of the emerging ‘new economy’ (Perez 2002: 33-35).  Conversely, for the critical realist 
conception such investment is the result of a much broader shift in the balance of power from 
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productive to finance capital as the expansion of the former comes up against the limits of the 
existing political economic hegemonic settlement and its associated spatio-temporal fixes.   
 
Two differences follow that are particularly striking.  First, as we have seen, for the critical 
realist theory the pivotal role of finance revolves around its power to enforce a round of 
primitive accumulation in phases of financialisation (Arrighi 2008).  Conversely, ETC sees 
no role for politics (beyond ad hoc national idiosyncrasy) in the creation of the new economy 
with repercussions for the role accorded to finance in the cycle of growth of the world 
economy.  This is also clear in the bizarre decision to omit global wars (e.g. 1914-18, 1939-
45) from the ETC schema of explanation (see Table 1), when it is surely obvious that such 
wars are both hugely significant geopolitically (and hence indirectly for innovation/ long 
waves) and periods of intense innovation per se. 
 
Secondly, because technological change is placed at the heart of its analysis, ETC sees the 
growth of finance as dependent on new technologies.  While it acknowledges that bubbles 
occur through the investment of finance in finance, it nevertheless places the new technology 
as the fundamental cause of financial dominance.  Conversely, the critical realist theory treats 
the growth in finance as a sui generis phenomenon of which new technology investment is 
merely one consequence.  And, taking the two points together, it focuses on the crucial 
interaction between finance and politics: the dependence of the former on political order, the 
political shift involved in its rise to dominance and its political effects. 
 
These differences have conspicuous implications for explanation of actual events.  Perez 
(2002: 77) is unequivocal that the end of the “frenzy” phase of a financial bubble economy is 
based on technology-based crashes: 
 
“There is one type of collapse, though, which is directly connected with technological 
revolutions.  It is the crash – or series of mini-crashes – that tends to close the casino 
bubble at the end of the frenzy phase.”  
 
Furthermore, she is clear that just such a crash occurred in 2000 and that such crashes 
precipitate “prolonged recession” (ibid.: 7) that then triggers the political backlash and safety 
valve of painful reform to accommodate the new paradigm.  Contrary to her analysis, 
however, following the dotcom bust (as well as the – geopolitical! – shock of 9/11 the 
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following year) the US (and world) economy did not collapse but GDP growth recovered: to 
2.5% in 2003, 3.9% in 2004 and 3.2% in 2005 (data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis).  
Moreover, as Blackburn (2006) has shown, the subsequent growth was still based on 
continuing financialisation, if not its acceleration.  Indeed, the continuing growth of such 
derivatives markets was a major factor in the subsequent Great Crash of 2008.  In short, it is 
clear that the bursting of the technology bubble did not solve the underlying economic 
problems, nor chastened finance capital more generally and brought it to heel, nor placed 
financial regulation on the political table.   
 
But on the critical realist conception, why should it?  If it is acknowledged that the 
dominance of finance over the economy is dependent primarily on political support and 
stability then there is no reason why it should not be able to withstand any number of 
financial crashes and shocks so long as its political dominance is not fundamentally 
undermined.   
 
An alternative strategy for Perez, of course, has arisen with the Great Crash of 
August/September 2008 and the subsequent economic crisis.  Hence, in a recent update on 
her position, Perez (2009) seeks to square this circle by claiming that “this time” the 
technological and financial crashes were “two episodes rather than one”.  But she can only do 
so at the cost of the credibility of this central pillar of her argument that the power of finance 
and the developmental phase of the global economy itself are primarily dependent on the 
fortunes of paradigmatic technologies, in this case, ICT.  
 
Moreover, and as further evidence for the neo-Gramscian theory and against Perez, even this 
almighty financial crash has not yet derailed the financialization of the global economy and 
the political dominance of neoliberalism.  But this is because there has still not been the 
fundamental political uproar and movement against finance capital’s dominance.  Only such 
a political change will spell the end of financialization but this moment’s emergence cannot 
be predicted, at least on the basis of such abstract models alone.  
 
While many ETC scholars are not uncritical of new technological developments and their 
potential social repercussions (e.g. Perez 2002: 4, Freeman 2001), therefore, the ETC 
framework they employ cannot fundamentally question the likelihood, possibility or even 
benefit of an emerging paradigm, let alone that of the cycle as a whole.  Instead, it focuses its 
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practical efforts on providing policy advice to minimise the economic problems caused by the 
inevitable birth; what Perez (2002: 113 & 158) calls “adaptive regulation” in order to 
“restrain the excesses” of these cycles.  Conversely, on the critical realist conception, it 
remains an open question whether or not there will be an emerging paradigm and whether or 
not it, and hence the cycle itself, is good for all groups and classes, let alone for humanity as 
whole, or even fundamentally compatible with the ecological conditions of human survival; 
i.e. precisely the open questions of contemporary politics of science, technology and 
innovation that we have stylized above in terms of ‘triple crisis’.   
 
ETC thus carefully avoids the neo-classical errors of reifying economic states as static 
equilibria, but itself necessarily reifies the processes and trajectories it identifies.  
Conversely, the critical realist analysis identifies real, transfactual tendencies that condition 
but do not determine the possible courses of future political action (including but not limited 
to government policy) to alter or construct the course of history, not merely to adapt to it.  
And it does this not through identification of heuristic ideal types but through examination of 
the presuppositions of our actual, given understanding of the social world. 
 
This illustration thus demonstrates the three ways in which ontological attention may 
contribute to an alternative economics appropriate to the challenges, political and epistemic, 
of the present in the form of a critical, explanatory economics of science.  First, by providing 
a relational Marxism through substantive transcendental argument, it sets a theoretical and 
methodological position that allows the contextualization and strengthening (not 
abandonment) of the many insights of EEI, incorporating ETC.  Secondly, by comparing its 
concrete explanations with those offered by substantive theories compatible with a ‘value 
theory of labour’ (in this case, neo-Gramscian IPE) this allows further criticism and 
development of explanations.  Lastly, but by no means least, while EEI is fundamentally neo-
Kantian in perspective, the development of a third philosophy that can incorporate and go 
beyond this perspective present the ontological and epistemic grounds on which to build a 
productive synthesis of this tradition of economics and a Marxian political economy that has 
to date paid insufficient attention to detailed empirical study of science and innovation. 
 
Conclusion  
Economics has been a key starting point for the critical realist programme in general – both in 
actual history (viz. Bhaskar, Lawson, Sayer, Jessop et al.’s early and/or abiding interest in 
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economic issues) and conceptually, regarding a turn to philosophy of science in order to open 
up alternative economic explanations.  Yet in an age of multiple crisis, including of capitalist 
political economy and the mainstream economic discipline purporting to study it, it is 
palpably no longer adequate – notwithstanding the major contributions of these philosophical 
arguments to date – to continue responding to demands to show the difference ontological 
attention makes by pleading that such demands are to misunderstand the argument.  This is so 
not just for epistemic reasons but also for political ones: in a rapidly changing and profoundly 
unstable social context that is now crying out for a different economics, critical realism must 
either ‘show its hand’ now in this regard or may forever be dismissed, robbed of its 
motivation. 
  
Conversely, we have explored significant contributions, direct and indirect, of ontological 
attention to an economic project of considerable contemporary importance: a critical, 
explanatory economics of science or, more accurately, a cultural political economy of 
research and innovation.  This, thus, begins to furnish a fitting response to those who would 
argue such analysis is simply a diversion from the real work of constructing such an 
alternative economics.  For it highlights how, far from being a distraction, ontological 
attention is a crucial parallel project and one that yields major gains at the level of substantive 
understanding of our contemporary situation.   
 
But this approach also responds to two other criticisms of critical realism that are not entirely 
unfounded.  First, against the argument that the philosophical project of establishing an 
ontology necessarily involves arrogant ex cathedra pronouncements that are expected to be 
‘applied’, engaging directly with an economics of science – and showing the pivotal role 
ontological analysis nevertheless plays in such a project – illustrates how this is 
fundamentally not the case.  Instead, we have a programme that actually is, and does not just 
call for others to be, engaged in parallel, inseparable and messy projects that have lessons in 
both directions.  This, in turn, also tackles head on (over-stated) criticisms regarding the 
supposed infallibility of critical realist ontological analysis.  For instance, concerted 
engagement with empirical studies of research and innovation force critical realist philosophy 
to take more seriously the ontological openness of an intensely techno-scientific world and 
the intrinsic epistemic limits this entails.
10
  In short, a more concerted engagement from 
                                                 
10
 This point is even more clearly brought out in engagement with constructivist STS (see Tyfield 2012b). 
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critical realism with substantive issues offers considerable benefits to critical realism itself as 
well.  It is hoped that, in this way, the major contributions ontological attention has to make 
are indeed realized. 
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